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Introduction
1 Charles Pierce did not write on international relations, but both William James and John
Dewey did. James was a member of the Anti-Imperialist League; he criticised US foreign
policy in editorials  and essays concerning America’s  involvements in the Philippines,
especially its war against Filipinos fighting for independence after the US acquired the
Philippines  in  1898.  James  also  wrote  on  the  theme  of  redirecting  energies  for  war
through alternative,  peaceful  channels.  The  idea  is  first  broached  in  The  Varieties  of
Religious Experience and then developed in his essay,  “The Moral  Equivalent of  War.” 1
Dewey was even more prolific on international relations: his writings include reflections
on topics such as coercion and the use of force, war and democracy, the role of America in
the world, American entry into the League of Nations, the outlawry of war, and the World
Court (see Cochran 2010). 
2 Yet, neither James nor Dewey features as a significant figure in accounts of the evolution
of  the  academic  discipline  of  International  Relations  (IR).  This  absence  is  especially
remarkable in Dewey’s case, in view of the sheer extent of his writing on the subject; the
fact that it appeared in widely-read journals such as The New Republic and Foreign Affairs;
and his  stature as  a  major  public  intellectual  during the formative period when the
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academic study of IR was being institutionalised. The experience of World War I, and the
hope of avoiding another war like it, generated an interest in the systematic study of war
and peace as a dedicated academic discipline: the first Chair in the subject, the Woodrow
Wilson Chair of  International Politics at the University of Wales at Aberystwyth,  was
established  in  1919.2 The  zenith  of  American  Pragmatism  thus  overlapped  with  the
development of IR as a social science. But a survey of histories of the discipline reveals no
reference to the philosophy of Pragmatism, despite an early connection in the field with
political  theory  and  classical  thought  about  international  politics  stretching  back  to
Thucydides.3 Through all of these histories I have found just one mention of a Pragmatist,
and that is a relatively brief nod to Dewey as an influence on others (Schmidt 1998: 99). 
3 I am careful to write that there is no mention of the philosophy of Pragmatism, because
‘pragmatism’ (with a small ‘p’) is a word that appears regularly in studies of international
relations,  most  typically  when  being  distinguished  from  the  application  of  moral
principle in world affairs. Indeed, it is widely argued that, in a world of diverse states,
each with its own interests and often competing with one another to survive, it is fool-
hardy to act  in line with what  moral  principle  demands rather than what  prudence
dictates. We are told that the statesman shapes policy in line with the national interest,
knows  the  facts  of  existing  conditions,  and  pays  special  attention  to  power  and  its
alignments. This understanding, attributed to the school of ‘realism’ in IR, attaches moral
value only to responsible action that pragmatically adapts policy to circumstances. I will
argue  later  that  the  potential  value  of  Pragmatism to  normative  theorizing  in  IR  is
something different from this position; but it should be acknowledged that, like realists,
Pragmatists  would  be  loathe  to  apply  moral  absolutes  to  matters  of  international
relations; attention must be given to the particular context of a problematic situation. 
4 So where are the Pragmatists in IR? The application of American Pragmatism4 to the
social science of IR has suffered in two key respects, which stem from a central concept
and surrounding discourse that runs through the history of the discipline: the anarchy
problematique.  The fact  that  international  politics,  unlike  domestic  politics,  lacks  an
overarching central authority is a major organizing element of scholarship within the
field. In one of its most stark formulations, anarchy is taken to imply that there is little
scope for political philosophy or theory in the international realm, since, as Martin Wight
famously wrote, those are forms of inquiry “appropriate to man’s control of his social life
[…] the theory of the good life. International theory is a theory of survival” (1966: 33). The
thinking goes  that  neither  American pragmatism,  nor any other  set  of  philosophical
ideas, can have purchase in this field of material forces. This is the first problem for
pragmatism in IR, and it is an ontological one: if the fact of anarchy structures all that
goes on in world affairs, then what scope is left for Dewey’s key concerns of theorizing
change and improving societal and inter-societal conditions?
5 The second difficulty  is  related to  the fact  of  anarchy as  a  habit  of  thinking in  the
discipline, but is epistemological rather than ontological. What do we know, and can we
know, about international relations? The discipline experienced a behavioral revolution
at a time when the anarchy problematique was being felt acutely: particularly in America,
the advent of the atomic age and the context of the Cold War made the development of a
science of international politics an urgent requirement. Stanley Hoffmann has described
IR as an ‘American’ social science defined by its positivist proclivities and its will to make
the study of international politics a policy science, a ‘how-to’ guide for wielding American
power  in  its  post-World  War  II,  global  role.  Thus,  despite  the  existence  of  a  rich,
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philosophically-inspired historical tradition of international political thought (see Brown,
Nardin & Rengger 2002), IR has not maintained a strong connection with political theory
or philosophy since its turn to positivism, but has oriented itself towards a presentist
vision of policy-relevant science. 
6 However, the bedrock of positivism that has dominated the discipline since the latter half
of the 1950s has experienced fissures of late. Confidence in the positivist schools that
came  to  dominate  the  field  since  the  1970s,  ‘neorealism’  and  ‘neoliberalism,’  was
fundamentally shaken by the failure of scholars to anticipate the events of 1989 that
ended  the  Cold  War  and  led  to  the  break-up  of  the Soviet  Union.5 What,  then,  of
prediction and control? An opening for interpretive approaches was created, and while
many of these adopted a form of “constructivism” that aimed largely to fill explanatory
gaps with ideational causes – a kind of IR positivism 2.0 – deeper challenges to positivism
emerged.  In  1989,  Yosef  Lapid  declared  the  advent  of  a  post-positivist  era.  New
approaches challenged both the anarchy problematique and the aims of prediction and
control  that had been at  the center of  the discipline for so long.  The 1990s brought
developments in normative IR theory, a revival of the classical approach of the English
School, feminist IR theory, and historical materialism and IR. It is in this milieu of a new
post-positivist phase of thinking in IR that pragmatism has found a point of entry. When
Steve Smith wrote the introduction to International Theory: Positivism and Beyond in 1996,
he posed the question, “if we wish to open epistemological space for alternatives to an
international relations based on empiricism, what other epistemologies are available”
(1996: 22-3). His answer was that the options were two: either a discredited rationalism or
pragmatism. However, in his survey of the emerging post-positivist approaches to IR at
the time, there was little pragmatism in sight. 
7 Today is a different story.  Jörg Friedrichs and Fredrick Kratochwil  recently set out a
program to introduce an alternative methodological approach in IR based on American
pragmatism that could “reconcile scientific inquiry with the requirements of practical
reason” (2009: 703). Special issues on the topic of pragmatism and IR have been published
in  Millennium:  Journal  of  International Studies,  the  Journal  of  International  Relations  and
Development, and the International Studies Review in 2002, 2007 and 2009 respectively. Here I
will argue that this is a critical moment to take stock of these developments, and reflect
on where they are heading. First, in order to understand what pragmatism might bring to
IR as  a  social  science today,  it  is  important  to  examine its  history and explain why
pragmatism appears not to have registered in its past. Why, as I noted above, have the
contributions of  James and,  especially,  Dewey apparently disappeared from the early
history of the field? Secondly, having examined what the problem was before, I go on to
argue that the opportunity that exists today for pragmatism to influence the field is
constructed upon its critique of empiricist epistemology, its anti-positivist credentials so
to speak; its scope for bridging plural methods; and the broadening of our understanding
of what international relations is, opening the range of possible ontological claims which
the discipline finds necessary at this time. 
 
A Historical Puzzle: Where are the Pragmatists?
8 Lucian Ashworth writes  that  the  discipline  of  IR  “is  a  twentieth  century  product  of
predominantly liberal Enlightenment concerns” (1999: 1). This raises a puzzle: why does
John Dewey, an important figure writing on themes of liberal internationalism in his day,
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not really feature? Ashworth is clear that his account is a revisionist account, challenging
the legacy of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes in the field. However, his point is that
their writings are not examples of IR scholarship. Instead, these writers are primarily
interested in the domestic polity and remark on the international as a side note to the
extent  that  an  external  dimension  intercedes  upon  thought  about  the  domestic.
Ashworth’s claim is that Enlightenment thinkers – Hegel being an important exception –
linked an international project of perpetual peace to their plans for the domestic polity.
Enlightenment themes of progress, political emancipation and the development of human
freedom were transposed onto the international. 
9 Some argue that IR grew into a discipline from thinking of this kind represented in action
and  popular  journalism.  W. T. R.  Fox  (1967:  2)  attributed  interest  in  the  study  of
international relations to the nineteenth century peace movements, of which James was a
member, and wrote that this generated an interest in arbitration and international law as
a vehicle for eliminating war, an activism that Dewey took an important position in when
he became a leading proponent of Salmon O. Levinson’s Outlawry of War movement after
WW I.  Dewey  wrote  on  many  themes  important  to  liberal  internationalists,  such
contributions making up almost  half  of  two volumes of  Characters  and Events:  Popular
Essays in Social and Political Philosophy in which Joseph Ratner collected Dewey’s political
journalism in 1929. What unifies these writings is an underlying concern that the moral
inclusion of individuals be made effective in the relations between states, that a new
diplomacy should arise out of the destruction of WW I that would give recognition to the
humanity of each individual and assist in the development of human capacities, making
manifest the idea of democracy in international affairs.  Kant and Dewey got there in
different ways, but each – like the early 20th century IR scholars Ashworth discusses –
wanted to see moral value attributed to individuals in the sphere of international politics.
10 And yet, if one searches not only histories of the discipline, but the books and articles
written by early contributors to IR, it is clear that Dewey was not regarded by them as
‘one of us.’ He does receive mention as an important figure lending his name and stature
to the cause of liberal internationalism, but he was not seen as a scholar of international
relations as such. Why? It is striking that the language Ashworth uses when he writes
about early IR scholars, such as Alfred Zimmern, H. N. Brailsford, Norman Angell and
David Mitrany, is that they made international relations the primary focus of their work
(1998: 4). At some level this must be right and relevant to our puzzle here. International
relations was not the primary focus of Dewey’s work. Dewey was a philosopher whose
intellectual  interests  drew  him  not  only  to  politics  and  international  relations,  but
psychology, education, religion, art and aesthetics. Given the breadth of his interests at a
time of the narrowing and professionalization of academic pursuits, it would have been
rather remarkable for him to have made a impact on the new discipline of IR in addition
to the other disciplines he is known to have influenced: psychology and education studies
especially.
11 However, the ‘who’ generating IR theory in the early 20th century was reasonably fluid in
the sense that it was not being created by academics sitting in IR departments or by
academics alone. As David Long writes, IR was “a fledgling social science in 1919; as such,
there were few international theorists in the disciplinary sense,” and not even in the
1920s or 1930s do we see the field professionalized; “There was therefore a space for
writers  and  publicists  not  located  in  an  academic  setting”  (Long  1995:  303).  So,  if
international relations theory was being created by academics who focused on IR, but did
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so  from departments  of  history,  law,  and later  politics  and economics,  and by  non-
academic  writers  –  e.g.  a  journalist  like  Walter  Lippmann  –  why  not  Dewey  as  an
academic philosopher who wrote about the nature of the international, and not just on
external aspects as they related to a theory of the state? What is so striking in relation to
this question is that themes one finds in Dewey’s writings match up with those Long
identifies in the non-academic IR he surveys. Among the academics writing non-academic
IR he includes Laski – particularly interesting given what follows below - or those outside
academe like J. A. Hobson, who were often writing on topics that preoccupied Dewey too:
interdependence, the democratic control of international relations, non-state actors, and
thinking about functionalism in the context of the international realm (Long 1995: 309;
Cochran 2010). The volume and quality of his writing on these themes do not appear to
have been sufficient to have made an indelible mark on the field. It remains a puzzle that
will  be raised,  but  not  answered in this  article.  Nevertheless,  Dewey had an indirect
impact upon International Relations, and one that I will argue grows more important for
the trajectory of IR as a discipline into its future.
 
Dewey and the Theory of State Literature in the Pre-
history of IR
12 I mentioned above that the sole, brief, tantalizing, reference to Dewey appears in Brian
Schmidt’s study, The Political Discourse of Anarchy, where he draws our attention to work in
the early days of Political Science on the theory of the state, and claims that its discussion
was important not only to the development of Political Science, but IR as well. Schmidt
traces the pre-history of IR to the early 1880s, when the first school of political science
opened at Columbia College. Early on, an influential paradigm emerged that anchored the
discourse of political science in the theory of the state, mimicking the German Staatslehre
(1998: 54). As the theory of the state developed in the late 19th century, it became the
context  in which both political  science and the study of  international  relations took
shape. According to Schmidt, “[t]he ontology of international relations, the character of
international  law,  the  possibility  of  a  world  state,  the  extent  to  which  there  was
international  organization  and  cooperation  among  states  were  all  determined  with
respect to the theory of the state” (1998: 76). Its influence was substantial in founding the
discipline and Dewey made a crucial intervention on the topic in 1874 in a commentary
on the theory of the state as discussed by John Austin. According to Schmidt, Dewey’s
views  were  picked  up  and  expounded  upon  by  an  important  scholar  for  the  new
discipline, Harold Laski.
13 In this pre-history, an early orthodoxy emerged in the form of the juridical theory of the
state, the conception of which owed much to Hobbes, Bodin and Austin. Schmidt notes
that W. W. Willoughby’s treatment of the juridical state was foundational to the discourse
that developed in the 1900s, and the idea of international relations that he developed
borrows from Austin (1998: 88-9). Austin’s belief that natural law can command no force
with individuals in a state of nature was transposed by Willoughby onto international
relations when he argued that like a person, the state has a will of its own and is “legally
supreme”6 with natural law having no more command over it than over individuals in a
state of nature. This opened the discourse of anarchy that would, as Schmidt argues,
feature throughout the development of IR as a discipline.7 In this formal, juridical notion
of the state formulated by Willoughby and others in the early 20th century, the core
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principle of the state was sovereignty, and sovereignty was its “legitimating will.”8 It is
Schmidt’s contention that juristic conceptions of the state came to be challenged in ways
that were deeply influenced by the philosophy of pragmatism (1998: 99). In his essay,
“Austin’s Theory of Sovereignty,” Dewey wrote that in Austin “there is a confusion of
sovereignty with the organs of its exercise, and that this confusion has for its result a
radical error concerning the mode in which sovereignty is exercised – an error which, so
far as acted upon, is likely to result in harm” (EW4: 73). Why? Dewey argued that:
in every existing civilized state governmental power is in the hands of a certain
body of persons,  capable of  more or less accurate assignment and thus Austin’s
conception seems to agree fairly with facts. But that there are such determinate
governments, is a matter lying quite outside the range of Austin’s theory; they exist
precisely because large social forces, working through extensive periods of time,
have  fixed  upon these  governments  as  organs  of  expression.  It  is  these  forces,
gradually crystallizing, which have determined governments and given them all the
specific  (determinate)  character  which  they  now possess.  Take  away  the  forces
which are behind governments – which have made them what they are, and the
existence and character of these governments is an accident, likely to be changed at
any moment. Admit these forces, and, since they determine the government, they
are sovereign. (EW4: 80)9
14 According to Schmidt,  Dewey’s argument resonated with Harold Laski and influenced
Laski’s  important  pluralist  critique  of  the  juridical  theory  of  the  state  that  gained
considerable momentum in the 1920s. Schmidt does not provide textual evidence for the
claim, however, Laski certainly read Dewey, and referred to Dewey’s essay on Austin in
his book, The Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays (1921). Laski was working at the
New Republic when Dewey was one of its regular contributors.
15 The emerging pluralist position, as Ellen Deborah Ellis characterized it in 1920, was to
deny “the essential unity and absoluteness of the state and sovereignty.”10 Dewey made
his own contribution in 1920 when he asked whether the state
is  not  just  an  instrumentality  for  promoting  and protecting  other  and  more
voluntary forms of  association,  rather than a supreme end in itself  […] As they
[voluntary  associations]  develop  in  number  and importance,  the  state  tends  to
become more and more a regulator and adjuster among them; defining the limits of
their actions, preventing and settling conflicts. (MW 12:196)
16 Dewey likened the state to the conductor of  an orchestra,  saying the “state remains
highly important – but its importance consists more and more in its power to foster and
coordinate the activities  of  voluntary groupings.”  Those groupings,  which promote a
diversity of goods, are the “real social units,” not states for Dewey. Thus, Dewey claims
that  “[p]luralism  is  well  ordained  in  present  political  practice  and  demands  a
modification of hierarchical and monistic theory” (MW 12: 196). It is also important to
note  here  that  Dewey  did  not  fail  to  comment  on  pluralism  in  relation  to  the
international  sphere,  writing  that:  1)  the  “abnormally  supreme position”  that  states
assume in war has led to the “increased demoralization” of the institution of war; and 2)
that  voluntary  associations  “do  not  coincide  with  political  boundaries,”  but  are
transnational. In general, there has been a “growth” of the international, of which these
unbounded voluntary associations are a part. Thus, he concludes that “internationalism
is not an aspiration but a fact, not a sentimental ideal but a force” which compromises the
traditional dogma of exclusive national sovereignty. It is the vogue of this doctrine, or
dogma, that presents the strongest barrier to the effective formation of an international
mind” (MW 12: 197).11 
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17 Laski similarly believed that the facts just didn’t match up with what was being claimed in
the juridical theory of the state. His aim was to reconstruct political theory such that it
reflected “institutions more fitted to the needs we confront”; that is, a pluralistic state
that substitutes “coordination for a hierarchical structure” (Laski 1921: vii). Like Dewey,
Laski argues that human association manifests itself in many ways and believes these
voluntary associations to be important, possessing a kind of sovereignty in themselves
which  runs  counter  to  the  monist’s  assertion  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  state  is
indivisible or omnipotent. However, as Schmidt points out, Laski’s empirical assertion is
followed by a normative one, and we find the same in Dewey too: the claim that the
sovereign state is not an end in itself, deserving of the moral rights conferred on it by a
now compromised juridical theory of the state. As Laski writes, “advocates of pluralism
are convinced that this is both administratively incomplete and ethically inadequate.”12
Finally, there are international implications of the pluralist critique for Laski as well. The
juridical theory of the state was getting in the way of thinking about the international
realm properly, and that it was “only by the abrogation of the idea of sovereignty in
international affairs that is there any real prospect of the working of international ideas
being placed upon a basis at once successful and sound” (Laski 1927: 290). 
18 IR  was  starting  to  come  into  its  own  at  this  point,  amounting  to  more  than  side
commentary on the external features of sovereignty as it pertained to a political theory of
the state. And Dewey played, at the very least, an indirect part in this transformation,
shaping the pluralism that directed the study of IR towards ways of thinking about the
facts  of  international  interdependence,  and about  how to  manage it  better  than the
juridical  sovereign  state  concept  had  made  possible.  Along  with  the  pluralism  that
impacted and influenced interwar IR came a will to mitigate the effects of anarchy and
reform international  relations,  placing the study of  international  organization at  the
center of what IR does. And it is important to underscore now, because of the direction
the study of IR took after WW II, and the tar of “utopianism” that E. H. Carr’s book The
Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939 brushed over the work of liberal internationalists, that it did
so not out of wishful, idealistic thinking, but out of keen attention to reality: their world
was  strikingly  global  and a  new interstate  organization for  managing the  growth of
international forces that were reaching beyond the control  of  sovereign states – The
League of Nations – had emerged. These phenomena required careful, dedicated study.13
Dewey agreed. Rebuilding after WW I required an acknowledgement that the Westphalian
model of state sovereignty was an anachronism; that a new diplomacy was needed to
coordinate cooperation in directing the forces of interdependence so as to improve the
life chances of  all,  rather than the interests of  states narrowly interpreted;  and that
trans-boundary voluntary associations should unite as international publics to assist in
shaping a more inclusive world politics, not leaving it to states alone (Cochran 2010). 
19 The scholarly concerns of Dewey and the liberal internationalists were bracketed in the
discipline  for  a  good  fifty  or  more  years.  The  naiveté  associated  with  liberal
internationalism has been so great as to hide from view the connection of their pluralism
with forms of pluralist critique that were to follow later in the discipline that shone light
on  cooperation  and  actors other  than  states  in  world  affairs,  e.g.  transnationalism,
functionalism,  and  complex  interdependence  (Schmidt  1998:  237).  Additionally,  their
marginalization  would  not  only  narrow  what  was  seen  in  the  world  as  worthy  of
empirical investigation, but it would put a brake on normative inquiry almost altogether.
Remember, the challenge of pluralism was an empirical as well as a normative challenge
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to the prevailing theory of the state. After WW II, the anarchy problematique submerged
the interest that pluralists such as Dewey and Laski had demonstrated in questions of
justice and the moral inclusion of individuals in world politics. It would not be until the
rekindling of normative theory in IR in the late 1980s and early 1990s that a passage such
as Laski’s would resonate again: 
[p]olitically, in its judgment of what it is entitled to do, a state considers not the
interest of humanity as a whole, not the obvious precepts of judgment and right,
but the basest considerations of expediency, as it chooses to interpret them. A state
becomes, in short, the judge of its own cause, and it is elementary that that is a
denial of justice. (Laski 1927: 290)
20 As we shall now see, that would be an important opening for Dewey too, in which he
would feature not only in the normative IR literature, but in 21st century calls for re-
examining methodologies in IR.
 
Emerging from a Deep Winter: Pragmatism and
Contemporary IR
21 The  IR  discipline  may  have  grown  out  of  liberal  Enlightenment  concerns,  but  such
concerns experienced a deep winter. As I indicated in the introduction, this was not only
due to the ontological implications of the anarchy problematique. The winter was made
harsher  by  methodological  preoccupations  of  molding  IR  into  a  proper  science.  IR
scholarship during the interwar years was not without aims to science, but these aims
were  not  as  yet  backed  by  the  full-blown  positivism  that  was  to  develop  after  IR
experienced its behavioral revolution in the mid-1950s. 
22 The influence of pragmatism in philosophy had long since waned as well, overtaken by
analytical philosophy. However, before the aim of replacing “ideographic statements with
empirical  generalisations”  (Wilson  1998:  10)  won  the  day,  realist  scholars  such  as
Reinhold  Neibuhr  and  Hans  Morgenthau  who  formulated  their  thought  more
traditionally in terms of organizing ideas and concepts, did engage with pragmatism, and
Dewey’s philosophy in particular (Bauer & Brigi 2009: 165). This engagement does not
register in the discipline either, even though realism’s own brand of traditionalism held
sway for  some time beyond the  mid-1950s  in  the  work of  not  just  Morgenthau and
Neibuhr, but Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, Raymond Aron, John Herz, and Martin
Wight.14 Science was not their plea, but rather the need to shift the focus of IR onto power
and politics,  over  cooperation and international  law and organization.  Attention was
thrown back onto sovereign states and their rational will as unitary actors to seek power
and calculate interest in terms of power. The Hobbes-Austinian theory of the state that
Dewey had criticised was back with a vengeance.
23 Positivism  settled  upon  the  discipline  in  waves  that  grew  more  forceful  over  time.
Positivism in IR is unified by four basic propositions: 1) belief in the unity of science; 2)
commitment to a strict fact/value separation; 3) belief in the existence of regularities in
the social as well as the natural world that licenses deductive-nomological and inductive-
statistical forms of covering law explanation; and 4) empirical validation, falsification,
being viewed as proper inquiry (Smith 1996: 16). Positivism hit IR as behaviorism in the
way it did across the social sciences in the mid-20th century. The behavioralists looked
for  eternal  laws  of  international  politics  left  uninvestigated  within  the  classical
foundations of realism. The avowed ‘scientists’ began to take a grip on the IR discipline
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beginning in the late 1950s.  Morton Kaplan’s  book,  System and Process  in  International
Politics (1957) is an exemplar and demonstrates “a firm commitment to the noncircular
objectivity  of  science”  (Kaplan  2000:  696).  However,  at  the  same  time,  a  traditional
realism of the kind found in the English School,  registered a challenge: Hedley Bull’s
critique of the American science of IR from the vantage point of his particular “classical
approach” (Bull 1966). More theoretical challenges were to follow, what Michael Banks
labels  “post-behavioralism”  in  IR,  exemplified  by  John  Burton’s  cobweb  model  of
international relations as opposed to the classic billiard ball model of realism that was
carried forward by the scientists.15 These challenges of the late 60s were followed by the
rise of  theories of  transnationalism and interdependence that were a reaction to the
weakness of states in the face of challenges like the oil crisis of the early 1970s. 
24 The next significant positivist wave hit as détente gave way to a second Cold War, and
realism resurged in the form of a structural explanation for the logic of power politics,
provided by Kenneth Waltz  in  his  book,  Theory  of  International  Politics (1979).  Waltz’s
structural  realism,  or  neorealism  as  work  of  this  genre  also  came  to  be  known,
represented the high tide of positivism that took hold of the discipline for approximately
ten years. While the neoliberal critique continued to flourish, growing out of work on
transnationalism, complex interdependence and later regime theory, it was only a mild
ontological tweaking of the anarchy problematique; it held that states remained the most
significant actors and that power and politics should continue to be the focus of attention
in  IR,  but  stressed  that  a  realm  of  cooperation  in  the  rules,  norms,  principles  and
institutions of international politics existed. But, while it echoed the earlier liberal belief
in  the  possibility  of  international  organization,  “neoliberalism”  did  not  share  their
normative  concerns,  and  it cannot  be  construed  as  an  epistemological  challenge  to
neorealism. Indeed, neoliberal critics applauded structural realism for having put the
discipline as a whole on a secure scientific footing, which is a powerful reason why this
contemporary expression of pluralism was so out of touch with the interwar pluralists,
and did not acknowledge its connection to ideas like those of Dewey. 
25 This degree of epistemological dominance, such that even the challengers of the leading
paradigm accepted its epistemological and methodological priorities with only a small
qualification of what was to be the subject matter of IR, led to two reactions. First, some
got  busy  generating  the  empirical  data,  either  to  substantiate  the  generalizable,
structural theory of international competition set in motion by Waltz, or to round out
that theory, examining how structural competition within anarchy impacted cooperation
demonstrated in the system. Second, some desperately sought ways of thinking outside of
the prevailing and powerful status quo,  often by getting back to political  theory and
philosophy. Thus, pragmatism’s first significant point of entry into contemporary IR was
through  Rorty’s  critique  of  the  correspondence  theory  of  truth, which  was  used  in
attempts to carve out a position beyond positivism in IR (Smith 1996, Cochran 1996, and
Puchala  1995).  Post-positivism has  since  gained  a  foothold,  and  new methodological
avenues are being explored, as are the subjects fit for examination within the discipline.
It is in this context that pragmatism is gaining significance for contemporary IR.
 
Themes of Pragmatism in Contemporary IR
26 “Readers of the contemporary literature in international relations [IR] increasingly find
calls for a pragmatic reorientation in theorizing the field” (Kratochwil 2011: 200). Where
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a survey of the early period of IR yields little mention of American pragmatism, such a
survey  today  produces  rather  different  results.  The  majority  of  interventions  on
pragmatic themes, and the ones that resonate most in the discipline today, are those that
aim to shed new light on the epistemological and methodological debates in which IR has
been caught up since the 1970s. For example, Friedrich and Kratochwil write that they do
not turn to pragmatism to be freed of such considerations; in the face of IR’s failure to
secure foundations of knowledge, to say “anything goes” is not an option. Instead, they
use pragmatism “as an instrument to go about research with an appropriate degree of
epistemological  and  methodological  awareness”  (2009:  707).  What  they  value  in
pragmatism is its recognition that knowledge generation is a social, discursive activity,
and that the aim of pragmatist inquiry is to produce useful knowledge. In particular, they
believe abduction is a “good bet” as a Pragmatist research methodology for IR, not the
only possible one, but the one they choose to develop. And they are not alone. Others
invoke Peirce and abduction as a research methodology with benefits for IR (Rytovuori-
Apunen: 2009; Finnemore 2003: 13; Ruggie 1998a: 94), however, Friedrichs, Kratochwil and
Rytovuori-Apunen are  the  first  to  have  provided a  thorough engagement  with  what
abduction represents methodologically; that is, the pragmatist philosophy that animates
it.16 
27 Sil and Katzenstein are also of the view that the paradigmatic debates of IR could do with
pragmatic interrogation. They advocate an opening out, a breaking of the constraints
placed on social scientific inquiry in IR by “paradigm bound” scholarship, and propose
that “analytic eclecticism,” inspired by pragmatism, could prove to be fruitful in this
respect. They describe as ‘eclectic’: 
any approach that seeks to extricate, translate, and selectively integrate analytic
elements  –  concepts,  logics,  mechanisms,  and  interpretations  -  of  theories  or
narrative that have been developed within separate paradigms but that address
related  aspects  of  substantive  problems  that  have  both  scholarly  and  practical
significance. (Sil & Katzenstein 2010: 10)
28 Analytic eclecticism draws on pragmatism in three ways. First, it finds the success of a
knowledge claim is  in  its  practical  consequences:  whether,  as  Dewey writes,  it  helps
scholars and citizens integrate ‘knowing’ and “doing.’ Secondly, it takes from Rorty the
idea that “there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones,” and prioritizes
inclusive dialogue with all who could be interlocutors. And thirdly, it draws on Mead’s
symbolic  interactionism  for  its  pragmatist  understanding  of  agency,  structure  and
identity (Sil 2009: 561). Sil and Katzenstein acknowledge that their appropriations may
seem crude to those who know the philosophy of pragmatism well, but that the dialogue
needs to get started, and once it has, what remains awkward in its appropriations from
pragmatism and their implications for IR can be worked out along the way (2010: 47).17 
29 A survey of pragmatist influences in the contemporary IR field yields much more besides.
There are claims to pragmatism’s benefit, and in some cases neo-pragmatism’s (Rorty’s),
for the discipline in the following: bridge-building, synthesis and dialogue creation across
IR paradigms (Sil & Katzenstein 2010; Hellmann 2003; Checkel 2005; Cochran 2000); in
theory cumulation or progress (Isacoff 2005; Chernoff 2004);  as an alternative idea of
what it means to be a social science (Jackson 2011 and 2010; Cochran 2002b); as a praxis-
based  philosophy  (Friedrich  &  Kratochwil  2009;  Owen  2002;  Bohman  2002);  as  a
multiperspectival  theory  (Bohman  2002);  for  its  invocation  of  language,  metaphor,
rhetoric (Sil & Katzenstein 2010; Kornprobst 2009; Cochran 2001b); on ontology (Kurki
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2008); on debates about state-personhood (Franke & Roos 2010); and for thinking about
foundations for judgment, ethical or otherwise, in areas such as foreign policy making
(Aalto 2011;  Cochran 2001a),  universal  human rights  (Wheeler  & Dunne 1998;  Brown
1997), intervention (Bellamy 2002; Wheeler 1997), migrants (Parker & Brassatt 2005); on
boundaries (Festenstein 2002); public spheres, global and regional governance (Bray 2010;
Wood 2011; Cochran 2010, 2008, 2002a; Bohman 2005; Brunkhorst 2002; Albert & Kopp-
Malek 2002).
30 To what do we owe this rich state of affairs? Pragmatism experienced a revival beginning
in the 1980s in the form of the neo-pragmatisms of Richard Bernstein, Richard Rorty, and
Hilary Putnam. Rorty’s anti-representational epistemology and idea of cultural critique
was an important source of IR’s re-engagement with pragmatism just at the time it was
looking for sources of philosophical inspiration, and it stimulated curiosity in the work of
the classical  pragmatists,  especially Dewey,  the writer to whom Rorty gave the most
credit for influencing his approach to philosophy. This is significant, but so too is the
constructivist turn in IR that is often credited for the blossoming of pragmatism in the
field (Kratochwil 2011; Widmaier 2004). 
31 Constructivism broke through to become the “third party” in what looked to be only a
two-party, positivist system of IR scholarship; a breakthrough confirmed by the inclusion
of constructivist thinkers in the 50th anniversary issue of International Organization on the
topic of  “Exploration and Contestation in the Study of  World Politics” (Finnemore &
Sikkink 1998). According to Alexander Wendt, a key constructivist innovator, there are
two basic insights behind the constructivist challenge to the “neo-neo” orthodoxy: first,
“that  the  structures  of  human association are  determined primarily  by  shared ideas
rather than material forces”; and secondly, “that the identities and interests of purposive
actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (1999: 1). Thus,
the causal powers attributed to the structure of the international system are not given, as
assumed by neo-realists and neo-liberals, but instead, are shaped by the way anarchy is
constructed in the social practices that exist between states; the way anarchy constrains
is  down  to  how  anarchy  is  construed  by  state  actors  within  the  system.  From this
beginning,  the  reconnection  with  political  theory,  philosophy  and  social  theory  in
American IR begins anew. As Wendt writes, the effects of anarchy could be something
quite apart from what the anarchy problematique suggests; and manifest as Hobbesian,
Lockean or even Kantian cultures (1999: 246-312). In view of our interest in the links
between  pragmatism  and  IR,  it  is  significant  that  Wendt  describes  his  own,  highly
influential, position – first presented in his often-cited 1992 article, “Anarchy is What
States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics,” but significantly elaborated
in his book, Social Theory of International Politics – as a synthesis of structuration theory
and symbolic interactionism, modeled in large part upon the work of George Herbert
Mead (Wendt 1999: 143).
32 It is therefore no surprise that one finds calls for a new “constructive pragmatism,” or
“pragmatic constructivism,” to take the discipline beyond its paradigm debates and on
towards dialogue, synthesis and progress in our knowledge (Kratochwil 2011; Hellmann
2003;  Haas  &  Haas  2002;  Widmaier  2004).  However,  I  would  argue  that  these  are
unnecessarily conservative  estimations  of  the  benefit  pragmatism  can  bring  to  the
discipline. I agree with Rupra Sil, who writes
[c]onstructivism  may  be  marginally  more  receptive  to  aspects  of  pragmatist
thought  (for  example,  Gould  &  Onuf  2008;  Haas  &  Haas  2008),  but  most
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Constructivists  in  the United States  remain ‘conventional’  (Checkel  2007)  in the
sense that their rejection of the ontologies underlying realism and liberalism has
not  been  accompanied  by  a  fundamental  challenge  to  epistemological  and
methodological perspectives derived from analytic philosophy. (2009: 648)
33 This might find agreement from IR constructivists of a different stripe, such as those
whom  John  Ruggie  describes  as  aiming  “to  resist  the  influence  of  American  social
scientific  modes  of  analysis”  (1998:  862).  There  is  diversity  apparent  within
constructivism. First, there are those who would be labelled along with Wendt and Ruggie
as the mainstream within constructivism and who are interested in causation, albeit of a
different,  more  ideational,  kind  from what  positivists  in  IR  had  previously  realised.
Second, there are those who take interpretation further down and do the “resisting” that
Ruggie suggests, who are not interested in a strict idea of social science, whether it be
what constructivists like Ruggie, Finnemore, Katzenstein, or Klotz have endorsed as a
neo-classical variant; or the naturalistic idea put forward by Wendt and Dessler. 
34 Constructivism has played an important role in providing a point of entry for pragmatism
by the simple fact that it stresses the role social interaction plays in making our world,
and  opens  opportunities  for  seeing  different  “things”  in  that  world  as  well  as  the
possibility for changing what we see for the better. However, what it has not gone on to
do  is  the  analysis  of  social  values attached  to  social  interaction.  For  all  the  interest
constructivists have shown in identifying and examining the international norms that
impact the social behaviors of states, and more recently the behaviors of a range of other
kinds of actors too - intergovernmental and non-governmental actors – the positivist bias
of the discipline that has bifurcated empirical from normative lines of inquiry has not
been  broken,  not  even  within  constructivism.  And  this  is  another  area  in  which
constructivism, and IR more generally, needs pragmatism too.
 
Evaluating Social Facts in IR
35 Normative IR theory is largely a product of British IR, and this can in part be attributed to
the fact that the ‘behavioural revolution’ that had lasting repercussions for American IR,
did not take a solid hold of the British IR community. Where normative and empirical
forms of political inquiry had come to be viewed in American IR as separate and markedly
different enterprises, with the latter emerging as overwhelmingly dominant, there was
no  similar  decoupling  in  British  IR.  The  empirical  work  conducted  by  writers  who
established  what  is  known  as  the  ‘English  School,’  or  the  international  society
perspective,  was  comparative-historical  and  its  interpretive  methods  were  less  at
variance  with  normative  analysis  than  American  proclivities  towards  scientific
hypothesis-testing.  Those  associated  with  the  English  school,  recognizing  the  mark
scientific theories were making upon the discipline, laboured to demonstrate the paucity
of  empirical  work  pursued  independently  of  thought  about  standards  for  evaluating
international political action. Theirs was a ‘classical approach’ as Hedley Bull called it and
he distinguished it from the new orthodoxy of the scientific approach in American IR,
which held: 
assumptions, in particular about the moral simplicity of problems of foreign policy,
the existence of ‘solutions’ to these problems, the receptivity of policy-makers to
the  fruits  of  research,  and the  degree  of  control  and manipulation that  can be
exerted over the whole diplomatic field by any one country. (Bull 1966: 376)
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36 By the late 1970s, British IR scholar James Mayall was writing that “we have seen the
collapse of this ‘value-free’ social science and now accept that values have to be brought
into IR theory, the question is how” (1978: 122).
37 One answer to this ‘how’ question was the development of normative IR theory in the UK,
in part as a response to perceived deficiencies within English School itself. The English
school did not eschew ethical judgement altogether, but it often allowed its historical
analysis of the actually-existing pattern of international order to dominate its views on
the reasonableness of  different  ethical  choices,  particularly between the intersocietal
values of order and justice and often prioritized order in the context of the Cold War.
While  they  saw  normative  analysis  as  necessary  to  inquiry  into  the  nature  of
international society, the English school’s capacity for normative theorizing was limited
by their unwillingness to make judgements when values conflicted, either across moral
traditions in Western thought or  across  plural  cultural  traditions in diverse political
societies. Theirs was a propensity for ‘detachment’ and the less controversial task of
laying out a rich panoply of patterns in which humans have reflected on the world and its
organization (Wight 1991). The school did not have an answer to the ‘how’ question and
avoided moral-philosophical reasoning, prompting the growth of normative IR in the UK.
The critique that emerged of the School from normative IR was for its presumption of the
good of the society of states because of the order it creates (Frost 1996: 115). Normative IR
challenged the School to defend what normative value there is in international society
and to think about an alternative organizing concept for the study of IR: what if we put
justice rather than order at the centre of our inquiries into world affairs. The difficulty is
that the English school lacked a method for doing this kind of inquiry, and constructivists
have the same problem today. 
38 Even though Ruggie had the English school in mind when he said that he would not
include under his umbrella of “constructivism” those whose analysis failed to fall in line
with the aims of American social science, many comparisons have been drawn between
the English School and constructivism.18 I am going to offer another, a suggestion that has
yet  to  be  made:  neither  of  these  approaches  is  self-consciously  pragmatist  in  a
methodological sense, but both encounter the same obstacle in their efforts to theorize
change in international society, and the impact of change on the international norms
which are the bread and butter of what each does. How is change to be directed? What is
the moral or social value of norms, and what is lost,  what is gained in the course of
change? English school and constructivist scholars who are genuinely interested in such
questions  will  have  to  study norms in  the  context  of  their  normativity;  that  is,  the
processes of valuation that go on in the practices of international society. Both the English
school and constructivists should be more interested in how valuation is done. Here is
where pragmatism has more to offer than has hitherto been appreciated.
39 As noted above, one of the lessons that IR scholars have taken from pragmatism is to let
methodological pluralism thrive; but this should extend too to the pragmatist research
strategies from which we draw. Dewey offers a method of normative social inquiry that
brings  together  empirical  and normative  lines  of  inquiry  backed by  a  philosophy of
valuation. Abduction is one method to be drawn from pragmatism, and I do not doubt
that Friedrichs and Kratochwil are right that it is a “good bet.” Yet, if social scientific
knowledge is  purposeful,  and the value of  such knowledge is  determined by “how it
enables  orientation  in  the  social  world,  including  the  tractability  of  relevant  social
problems” (Friedrichs & Kratochwil 2009: 706), then consideration is essential of the role
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moral  judgment  plays  not  only  in  the  act  of  seeking  knowledge  for  purposes  of
orientation, but in thinking about the tractable in world politics and what action might
be  taken  in  relation  to  it.  This  suggests  that  valuation  too  could  be  an  important
pragmatist research tool in assisting orientation in the social world. We should not let the
idea  drop,  perhaps  out  of  residues  of  dichotomous  fact/value,  empirical/normative
thinking, that other avenues of pragmatist research may be worthy of our interest and
Dewey’s valuation is one such method. As Peter Manicas wrote in the first volume of the
symposia: 
Dewey  believed,  rightly,  that  human  sciences  could  help  us  to  understand
ourselves:  how  we  think  and  inquire and  why,  when  thinking  and  inquiry  is
successful, it is successful. They would give us insight into what were our genuine
interests and purposes and their relations, and most obviously, they would give us
an  understanding  of  the  obstacles  in present  arrangements  that  keep  us  from
realizing our genuine interests and purposes. (Manicas 2011: 16)
40 For their different reasons, when scholars of the English School, constructivism or any
other,  even pragmatist-inspired,  approach to IR conclude that there is  little point in
inquiring into the nature of values in international relations, what is good or what is bad,
they are missing a key point of Dewey’s philosophy. There is no problem of knowledge in
relation to the truth of a value; there is instead, warranted assertability to be found in the
clues provided in the particular social values of the communities sharing in a problem,
clues which are rendered through a working method of  inquiry.  The aim of Dewey’s
method is formulated simply too: to illuminate what our actually existing purposes are
and the obstacles in their way as we work to adapt better to our changing world. As
Dewey writes, our ends-in–view are but hypotheses to be tested in present conditions and
can alter our ways of dealing with social issues for the better or not (LW 12: 491). The
proof, or warranted assertablility, is in the doing and in the outcomes of their application
helpfully working for those concerned.
41 Thus, what distinguishes the philosophy of valuation and the method of Deweyan inquiry
in IR is its scrutiny of: 1) social values and the reasoning associated with those values; 2)
the interrelation of social values with the facts of problems found in international society;
and 3) a critical method of intelligence with a view towards uncovering, or constructing
where needed, an integrative value for improved problem-solving in the management of
international society. Efforts at valuation in future research could add insight into what
social values are at play in contemporary international affairs, and how an expansion of
value horizons  might  facilitate  the  creation of  a  coherent  conceptual  framework for
articulating  common  goals  within  the  international  practice  of  issue  domains,  like
nuclear weapons or climate change, where there is clearly an acute problematic situation,




42 Since the positivist grip on the discipline of IR has loosened, numerous approaches have
found space within which to develop: constructivism, a revitalized English school, and
normative approaches drawing upon a range of  thinking from classical  international
political thought to Frankfurt School critical theory, French poststructuralism, feminism,
and American pragmatism too. Each of these new approaches shares Dewey’s conviction
that social learning can and does take place at the international level in response to
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changed  international  conditions.  International  institutions  and  international  norms
have grown more extensive and encompassing in the years since the classical pragmatists
were  writing.  Do  international  social  conditions  today  reflect  what  the  liberal
internationalists  aimed  to  describe  and  understand,  the  possibility  of  making  social
institutions better with the ends of individuals in view? Is there scope for thinking about
justice as  well  as  anarchy in the study of  international  relations? On the long view,
writers like Osiander (1998) believe the so-called ‘idealists’ performed better at seeing the
future of IR than the realists of that first great debate in IR. 
43 It has been the claim of this article, that in the early days of the discipline pragmatism did
not  really  feature,  but  for  Dewey’s  indirect  contribution  to  the  theory  of  the  state.
However, this contribution was not insignificant. It holds many lessons for the pluralisms
that were to follow19 in the ontological sense of what counts for study in the discipline.
The shame is the disconnect created by the epistemological proclivities of IR when those
new  pluralisms  were  flourishing;  there  was  no  hook  up  to  those  lessons  and  so
pragmatism’s relevance only really surged when the discipline began to break free from
the dominance of positivism. The discipline first turned to pragmatism as a critique of the
assumptions of positivism, and to shape its calls for methodological pluralism. A further
shame would be to leave it there. There is more that pragmatism has to offer: Dewey’s
philosophy of valuation and method of normative social inquiry was the one highlighted
here. There may be others. But note that when we look back to the key formative moment
of the IR discipline after WW I, and we cannot seem to find pragmatism there, even at a
time when its philosophy was ascendant, a new, still plastic discipline was on the rise, and
that philosophy was speaking to it, one can only call it a missed opportunity. Now, here
comes another opportunity. IR is calling you, the philosophers of pragmatism. Sil and
Katzenstein admit that their borrowings from pragmatism are crude and that they will
need assistance in its application to analytic eclecticism along the way. The substantive
concerns of James and Dewey at least stand as evidence that there is no reason why
philosophers should  turn  away  from  international  problems.  Will  philosophical
pragmatists demonstrate an interest in international relations once again?
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NOTES
1. John McDermott writes in the introduction to William James’s Essays in Religion and Morality
that “the ideas put forward in James’s essay were taken up in the United States on two occasions.
First,  during the depression of  the  1930s  the Civilian Conservation Corps  was  modeled after
James’s plan.  (In fact,  under the leadership of a philosopher,  Eugene Rosenstock-Huessy,  one
such camp in New Hampshire was called Camp William James.) A second affirmation of James’s
viewpoint occurred with the founding of the Peace Corps during the presidential administration
of John F. Kennedy. The Peace Corps was structured as an alternative to conscription, and the
influence of James's essay was cited on behalf of that bold political move” (James 1982: xxvi).
2. David Davies, the founder of The Woodrow Wilson Chair, was motivated in this way and the
Chair was intended in part as a memorial to students of the university who died in the Great War.
See Porter 1989.
3. Histories of the discipline surveyed include:  Asworth 1999;  Banks 1984;  Boucher 1998;  Fox
1968; Hinsley 1963; Hinsley 1963; Kaplan 1961; Keene 2005; Knutsen 1992; Long & Wilson 1995;
Olsen 1972; Olson & Groom 1991; Osiander 1998; Schmidt 1998; Williams 1991. I have excluded
from this survey scholarship in the field of diplomatic history, which is of course related to, but
has always been something apart from IR, given the social scientific aspirations of the latter.
Worthy of note within this genre is Crabb 1989, American Diplomacy and the Pragmatic Tradition.
4. After  making clear  the  use  of  pragmatism,  small  ‘p,’  in  IR  as  distinct  from the American
philosophy, I will now revert to writing of the philosophical tradition in the more typical way,
without a capital “P.”
5. This  point  is  made by Peter  Katzenstein in  the introduction to  his  volume,  The Culture  of
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (1996). 
6. Willoughby as quoted in Schmidt (1998: 88).
7. Schmidt writes the idea that the study of IR consists principally of “issues arising from the
existence of sovereign states in the absence of a higher central authority” gives the discipline its
“distinct discursive identity” (1998: 41). 
8. Willoughby as quoted in Schmidt (1998: 88).
9. Dewey reflects again on the theory of the state, invoking Austin in his 1888 essay, “The Ethics
of Democracy” (EW 1: 227-49). In making his argument for an organic conception of society in
which “society exists for and by individuals,” Dewey writes, “[t]he English theory, as presented
by Hobbes and worked out by Austin, virtually makes it [sovereignty] consist in irresponsible
power (EW 1:  236).  Interestingly,  in this  same essay,  Dewey also remarks on J. C. Bluntschli’s
organism, and Schmidt refers to Blunschli as a contributor to the theoretical discourse of the
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state that influenced IR. Clearly, Dewey was a participant in this scholarly debate within political
science in a way he did not seem to be as IR got underway post WW I.
10. Ellis as quoted in Schmidt (1998: 164).
11. The  use  of  the  term,  ‘international  mind’  by  Dewey  in  this  essay  and  others  (e.g.
“Emancipation  of  the  International  Spirit,”  LW  3:  349)  demonstrates  his  emersion  in  the
scholarship of the liberal internationalists who were building IR, since the concept features in
important works by two early notables in IR, Alfred Zimmern and Nicholas Murray Butler (also
the President of Columbia University who hired Dewey and brought him to New York in February
of 1905).
12. As quoted in Schmidt (1998: 165).
13. Indeed,  Carr  is  credited  with  framing  the  first  great  debate  in  IR  between idealism and
realism, the effects of which have been so lasting that articles and books are still being written
today challenging its thesis that the idealists or utopians – as the liberal internationalists were
labeled – were out of touch with the realities of world politics. Schmidt’s attention to pluralism
and its significance for the pre-history of IR does the discipline the great favor of reminding it
that the liberal internationalists built their contribution to the discipline challenging what was
perceived to be reality then. In addition to Schmidt, see Wilson 1998 and Osiander 1998. 
14. I have found one other reference to pragmatism from this period in a 1955 review article on
methodology for political science which argues in a section on “The Problem of Knowledge,” that
a grounding in the philosophic aspects of method (rationalism, empiricism, positivism, logical
positivism) is important. It refers readers to Dewey and Bentley’s co-authored book, Knowing and
the  Known (largely  because of  Bentley’s  early  work on the processes  of  government being of
interest to political scientist), but urges readers to dig deeper and look at almost anything within
pragmatism to gain a background in what “has been so influential in the philosophy of science
and social science” (Driscoll and Hyneman, 1955: 14). In America at this time and still today, IR is
a subfield taught within political science departments at most universities.
15. John Burton, an Australian diplomat who became a UK-based academic, developed a ‘world
society’ approach that was inspired by behavioralism, but he employed it for purposes different
than those found in the US. Where behavioralism served to provide a more scientific basis for
realism in the US,  ‘world society’  theorists  used behavioralism to challenge the state-centric
assumptions of realists, including those of the English school. They also employed it differently
in the sense that they were less zealous in regard to quantification (Banks 1984).
16. Pierce is also invoked in another context by Fred Chernoff (2004), who draws upon Pierce’s
account of scientific progress to demonstrate that the literature on the democratic peace theory
has achieved ‘progress’ of a kind found in the natural sciences.
17. In Sil and Katzenstein (2010: 45-7), the authors offer four broad pragmatist ideas about social
inquiry that have influenced their work. The first principle is by and large the same as above.
The second, principle is the third in the 2010 version. Mead and symbolic interactionism remain,
but another pragmatist principle is added: that knowledge must adapt to novel experiences and
changing circumstances.
18. Scholars in the UK who have written about the English School’s constructivist credentials
include Dunne 1995,  1998;  and Buzan 2001.  American constructivists  who acknowledge early
constructivist insights in the work of the English School include: Klotz 1995; Finnemore 1996;
Ruggie 1998; Keck & Sikkink 1998. For a view from an Australian who has spent time in both
contexts  and  thought  about  the  synergies  of  each  approach,  see  Reus-Smit C.  2002.  This
engagement has done much to revitalize the English school since the passing of its key members;
in fact, a new English School section of the International Studies Association was created in 2003.
19. For example, see Long (1995: 321-2).
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ABSTRACTS
The discipline of International Relations [IR] is experiencing a pragmatist turn. Here I will argue
that this is a critical moment to take stock and reflect on where it is heading. First, in order to
understand what  pragmatism might  bring to  IR  as  a  social  science  today,  it  is  important  to
examine the history of IR and explain why pragmatism appears not to have registered in its past.
Why have the contributions of Wiliam James and, especially, John Dewey apparently disappeared
from the early history of the field? Secondly, having examined what the problem was before, I go
on  to  argue  that  the  opportunity  that  exists  today  for  pragmatism to  influence  the  field  is
constructed upon its critique of empiricist epistemology, its scope for bridging plural methods,
and the broadening of our understanding of what international relations is, opening the range of
possible ontological claims which the discipline finds necessary at this time.
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